"Green-grabbing", in which environmental arguments support expropriation of land and resources, is a recognized element in neoliberal conservation. However, capitalism's strategic interest in promoting the neoliberalization of conservation is accompanied by attempts to exploit hitherto protected natures without any pretence at "greenness". In this paper we explore the dialectics between "green" and "un-green" grabbing as neoliberal strategies in the reconstruction of nature conservation policies after the 2008 financial "crash" in Greece and the UK. In both countries, accelerated neoliberalization is manifested in diverse ways, including initiatives to roll back conservation regulation, market-based approaches to "saving" nature and the privatization of public nature assets. The intensification of "green" and "un-green" grabbing reflects capitalism's strategic interest in both promoting and obstructing nature conservation, ultimately leaving for "protected natures" two choices: either to be further degraded to boost growth or to be "saved" through their deeper inclusion as commodities visible to the market.
to hide policies that are destructive to both ecosystems and people and as a strategy by 36 which capitalism seeks to advance itself as the means to "save nature". These two 37 disparate inclinations are brought together as a self-contained package: capitalism is 38 used to solve environmental problems it has generated, in turn creating more problems 39 and opportunities for capitalism to "help"; meanwhile all non-market based forms of 40 conservation become illegible, progressively excluded from the dominant conservation 41 discourse. 42
However, such "green grabbing" does not operate either without contradictions 43 or evenly around the globe. Capitalism's strategic interest in promoting a neoliberal 44 version of conservation, via its further inclusion into market function, goes hand in 45 glove with parallel processes whereby capitalism seeks to obstruct the conservation of 46 species and ecosystems, and to grab and exploit hitherto protected natures without any 47 9 so that state regulation is "light touch" and more actors become self-governing, and in 152 "rolling-out" state policies that facilitate the further privatization and marketization of 153 nature (Castree 2008a ). The privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal 154 feature of the neoliberal project, aiming to open up new fields for capital accumulation 155 (Harvey 2005) and it consists of the assignment of clear private property rights to 156 social or environmental phenomena that were previously state-owned, unowned, or 157 communally owned (Castree 2008a) . 158
In the current context, of a neoliberalism in crisis, we therefore witness not an 159 end to nature's exploitation but rather an intensification (see Smith 2010, p 
266). As 160
Harvey (2010, p 11) argues, financial crises "typically lead to reconfigurations, new 161 models of development, new spheres of investment and new forms of class power": 162 that is also true of conservation. 163
In the following section, we consider the similarities and differences between 164 provisions for conservation in Greece and the UK. Then we explore the neoliberal 165 restructuring of nature conservation in the post-crisis era by paying attention on the 166 dialectics of green and un-green grabbing. 167
168

Nature conservation in Greece and the UK 169
The history of conservation in the UK and Greece shows significant differences in 170 institutional arrangements and political-economic background that illustrate the 171 variegated character of nature conservation under capitalism. 172
In Greece, conservation has historically been state-initiated and mostly done on 173 public land. The first national parks were established in 1938 and 1971, in periods of 174 rule by dictators. The relevant conservation laws reflected the conservative concept of 175 "untouched wilderness" (Apostolopoulou et al 2012) . Neoliberal elements were brought10 into conservation during the 1990s: an increase in the number of PAs was accompanied 177 by the emergence of various partnerships between statal, parastatal, voluntary and 178 market actors. "Protected nature" was positioned as a potential source of profit through 179 various EU-funded projects, green products and tourist investments, and several non-180 state actors began to sit on important state committees whereas market proxies were 181 clearly introduced in conservation legislation (e.g. law 2742/1999). 182
Although payments began to be made to private environmental actors, the 183 private sector remained reluctant to invest in conservation. Capital perceived 184 environmental legislation as threatening its interests, and governments avoided strict 185 environmental controls on the freedom of landowners and businesses, on the grounds 186 these would hinder economic development or private property rights ( In parallel to cuts in personnel and resources, an extensive deregulation began, 256 aiming to boost investments by surpassing the obstacles of the legislation. Two laws 257 (3853 and 3894 or the "fast-track" law) were passed in 2010 creating a "one stop shop" 258 services for new businesses to attract investments and accelerate public-private 259 partnerships. The "fast track" law defined a new category of "strategic investments" for 260 which fundamental derogations from environmental law could be made to facilitate, 261 inter alia, expropriations of public land. This opened up a route to "un-green grabbing". 262
The "fast track" law is applicable to all PAs types, except Natura 2000 areas of absolute 263 protection and responsibility for its implementation was given to a société anonyme, 264
The Greek state had a central role as market manager in facilitating "strategic" 266 investment, and releasing capital from the restrictions of environmental protection. This 267 involved mobilization and transformation of the whole institutional framework of the 268 state, reflecting a close interplay of deregulation and re-regulation (see also Peck 2001) . 269
This had been a significant trend since the 2000s but in 2011 it was significantly 270 extended by the "Aid for Private Investment" law (3908), which aimed at promoting 271 economic growth by introducing state aid for the private sector to improve 272 entrepreneurship, technological development, and enterprises competitiveness. 273
To facilitate "un-green grabbing" further, fundamental changes were made to 274 environmental licensing, by simplifying and accelerating procedures to complete 275 environmental impact assessments and approve environmental terms (IMF 2011; laws 276 assessment of certain projects within Natura 2000 sites (e.g. housing development, 278 shopping malls of up to 2,000 m 2 ) and were combined with the permission to establish 279 "Areas of Integrated Tourism Development" (POTA 4 ). Some forms of land acquisition 280 combined elements of "green" and "un-green" grabbing, notably the construction of 281 renewable energy projects within PAs. Huge public subsidies were given to renewable 282 energy projects (creating a debt accumulation in the Renewable Energy Account, IMF 283 2013), and the government's commitment to privatizing the Public Power Company 284 (IMF 2013, p 172) was accompanied by land acquisition and development on land of 285 conservation status. This "un-green" grab of protected land for ostensibly "green" 286 purposes highlights the complex interplay of "green" and "un-green" grabbing. 287
Again the deregulation of legislation was followed by new regulations to allow 288 such developments. These were included in the biodiversity law (3937/2011) which was 289 (surprisingly) welcomed by the biggest ten environmental NGOs 5 . New regulations not 290 only opened PAs to further exploitation but also legitimized past derogations allowing, 291 inter alia, the post-facto legalization of illegal buildings within PAs. The Government 292 argued that legalization would require paying a fine which would be deposited in the 293 "Green Fund" to offset adverse effects. In 2013, the Fund had 1,9 billion euros, 1,5 of 294 which comes from arbitrary building 6 . However, the "Green Fund" law (3889/2010) 295 was amended twice, such that only 2.5% of funds could be used for environmental 296 actions, while 97.5% would be transferred to the main state budget. businesses. These included a commitment to cut "red tape", introducing a "one-in, one-369 out" rule whereby no new regulation would be brought in without other regulation being 370 cut by a greater amount. There was also a commitment to replace what was described as 371 a culture of "tick-box" regulation with "targeted inspections of high-risk organizations" 372 through "co-regulation and improved professional standards" 21 . 373
In July 2011, the government announced a drastic simplification of planning 374 regulations controlling development (GOV.UK 2011). It proposed to cut over a 375 thousand pages of planning advice to around 50 pages, to "encourage sustainable 376
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[economic] growth" (Vaughan 2012 ). Notwithstanding the rhetoric of "sustainable 377 development", the government's aims were clear: "growth at any environmental cost to 378 jolt the nation's flatlining economy" (Vaughan 2012) . 379
Perhaps the most significant way in which neoliberalization found purchase in 380 public policy for conservation after 2008 is through the idea of nature providing 381 "ecosystem services" (Norgaard 2010 Committee described the approach as simplistic and an admission of failure of the 422 planning system: it suggested the approach should be put on hold 24 . Newspapers 423 described the approach as "a license to trash nature" (Carrington 2013) . while criticising others that they considered to be negative (such as laws regarding 450 environmental licensing and forests or attempts to lease islands) 27 . capital has sought to intensify the exploitation of protected natures through "un-green 572 grabbing", a process made possible because capital has been able, to a large extent, to 573 make the state apparatus its own entrepreneurial entity, "a purer catalyst of capitalist 574 expansion than ever before" (Smith 2010 , p 260). 575
